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DIPLOMACY AS A MEANS TO SUCCESSFULLY DISARM
NORTH KOREA
JADE PALOMINO *
1.

INTRODUCTION

Despite North Korea’s agreement on February 13, 2007 to shut
down its nuclear reactor and allow United Nations inspectors back
into the country, 1 in addition to the country’s participation in the
sixth round of the Six-Party Talks in September 2007, 2 the
likelihood of successfully disarming North Korea is quite dismal at
the time of this writing. On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched a
multistage rocket 3 and, little more than a month later, it conducted
its second nuclear test. 4 On April 14, 2009, North Korea’s foreign
minister announced that the country was permanently quitting the
Six-Party Talks and resuming their nuclear enrichment program, 5
which reached its “concluding stages” on September 3, 2009. 6
This Comment argues that North Korea has little incentive to
comply with the disarmament agreements to which it is party

* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1 See North Korea’s Nuclear Activities: Timeline, TELEGRAPH, May 25, 2009,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/5381109/Nort
h-Koreas-nuclear-activities-timeline.html (providing a timeline of North Korea’s
nuclear activities and international attempts to restrict them).
2 Schedule of the Second Session of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks,
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce
/event/2007/9/1175582_856.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
3 See generally Peter Spiegel, U.S. Warns North Korea Against Nuclear Activity,
WALL ST. J., May 30, 2009, at A8 (discussing the fallout is the United States
following North Korea’s missile test).
4 See Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea Says It Tested Nuclear Device, N.Y. TIMES,
May 25, 2009, at A1 (describing the second nuclear test conducted by North
Korea).
5 See Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea Started Uranium Programs in 1990s, South
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/07
/world/asia/07korea.html (discussing the history of North Korea’s uranium
program).
6 David E. Sanger, North Korea Reports Advances in Enriching Uranium, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2009, at A3.
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because the enforcement mechanisms currently available under
international law are ineffective and the agreements themselves
allow for abuse.
The underlying source of North Korea’s
unwillingness to disarm, however, is the United State’s hostile
diplomatic policy towards the country, which undermines the
terms of these already vulnerable agreements. The United States
must therefore abandon its antagonistic and uncompromising
approach if it hopes to successfully disarm North Korea.
Part 2 of this Comment outlines the various disarmament
treaties and agreements North Korea was party to and outlines
their shortcomings. Part 3 discusses the enforcement mechanisms
available under international law to bring North Korea into
compliance with these commitments and their inherent
weaknesses. Part 4 explores the United States’ past diplomatic
approach to North Korea through the framework of the Six-Party
Talks and reaffirms its ineffectiveness. Part 5 offers creative
diplomacy as a solution to the problem of North Korean
disarmament.
2.

NORTH KOREA’S DISCORDANT RELATIONSHIP WITH
DISARMAMENT TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

North Korea’s disregard for international disarmament
agreements is evidenced by its violation of the Nonproliferation
Treaty, the Agreed Framework, the International Atomic Energy
Agency Safeguards, and the North-South Declaration on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Thus, if the United
States cannot instill a sense of respect for international law in the
North Korean government, it must, at least, make North Korea
leaders respect the United States, one of the major parties it forms
these agreements with, if it hopes to disarm North Korea.
The Nonproliferation Treaty 7 (“NPT”) was formed on July 1,
1968 with the purpose of accomplishing the peaceful use of nuclear
energy, 8 as well as non-proliferation 9 and disarmament. 10 North
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature
July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
8 See id. art. IV(1) (acknowledging the “[i]nalienable right of all the Parties . . .
to develop research, production and use . . . nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes”).
9 See id. art. I–II (declaring State parties’ promise to neither transfer nor
receive “nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such
weapons or explosive devices”).
7
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Korea joined it as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1985, 11 ultimately
withdrawing in 2003. 12 Non-weapon parties to the NPT must
agree to accept safeguards by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (“IAEA”) that allow the agency to monitor for
compliance. 13 North Korea joined the IAEA in 1974, 14 but
ultimately withdrew in 1994. 15
In 1992, to fulfill its obligations under the NPT, North Korea
announced the amount of plutonium—the ingredient used to make
nuclear weapons—it had separated from damaged fuel rods. 16
IAEA inspectors discovered that the levels of plutonium made
exceeded those actually reported. 17 When IAEA inspectors went to
further investigate the misinformation in January 1993, North
Korea did not allow them to enter 18 in contravention of its

10 See id. art. VI (stating that states must pursue “[n]egotiations in good faith
on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control”).
11 See IAEA and DPRK: Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards, IAEA.ORG,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaDprk/fact_sheet_may2003.shtml
(last visited Feb. 21, 2011) [hereinafter IAEA Factsheet] (outlining North Korea’s
nuclear safeguards).
12 See Andrew Ward, N Korea Quits Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, FIN.
TIMES, Apr. 11, 2003, at 11 (describing North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT
and the lack of a cohesive response “to the communist state’s suspected nuclear
weapons programme”).
13 See NPT, supra note 7, art. III(I) (“Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party
undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement . . . with the
International Atomic Energy Agency . . . with a view to preventing diversion of
nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.”).
14 IAEA Factsheet, supra note 11.
15 See id. (“Although the withdrawal did not affect [North Korea’s]
obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, which in the Agency’s view remains
binding and in force, [North Korea] took the position that it was . . . no longer
obliged to allow inspectors to carry out their work under the Safeguards
Agreement.”).
16 See David Albright, North Korean Plutonium Production, 5 SCI. & GLOBAL
SECURITY 63, 63 (1994) (describing the history of North Korea’s separation of
plutonium from damaged fuel rods and potential for future plutonium
separation).
17 See id. (noting that North Korea may have separated enough plutonium to
build one or two nuclear weapons).
18 See William J. Perry, Proliferation on the Peninsula: Five North Korean Nuclear
Crises, 607 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 78, 81 (2006) (“[E]vidently
surprised at the thoroughness of the inspectors, refused them access to the spent
fuel storage area for more detailed examination.”).
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Safeguards Agreement. 19 Unwilling to honor its commitments,
North Korea left the IAEA and soon threatened to leave the NPT. 20
On January 20, 1992, North Korea signed the North-South
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula under
which both agreed to refrain from testing, manufacture,
production, acceptance, possession, storage, deployment, or use of
nuclear weapons. 21 North Korea ignored the provision in the
declaration that called for a bilateral nuclear inspection regime 22 in
January 1993 when it refused IAEA inspections of its facilities. 23
In an attempt to avoid the nuclear threat that North Korea
presented, the United States negotiated the Agreed Framework,
which forced North Korea to cease its nuclear program and allow
inspections in exchange for obtaining two modern nuclear
reactors. 24 In October 2002, North Korea admitted to having a
clandestine nuclear program in violation of the Agreed Framework
and the NPT. 25 Two months later, North Korea lifted the freeze on
its plutonium program and expelled inspectors that were

19 See Int’l Atomic Energy Ass’n [IAEA], Agreement of 30 January 1992 between
the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the International
Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. XLVIII, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/403
(Jan. 30, 1992) [hereinafter Safeguards Agreement] (“The Agency, in co-operation
with [North Korea], may send inspectors to verify the design information
provided to the Agency . . . .”).
20 See Perry, supra note 18, at 81 (stating that North Korea announced their
withdrawal from the NPT in May 1994).
21 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, N. Kor.S. Kor., Jan. 20, 1992, 33 I.L.M. 569 [hereinafter the North-South Joint Declaration].
22 See id. (“The north and south shall make an inspection of objects chosen by
the other side . . . in order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula.”)
23 See Perry, supra note 18, at 81 (noting that after the inspectors left, North
Korea began preparations to refuel).
24 See Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, U.S.-N. Kor., art. I, Oct. 21, 1994, 34 I.L.M.
604 [hereinafter Agreed Framework] (stating that the U.S. would provide North
Korea with a light-water reactor in exchange for North Korea freezing its
graphite-moderated reactor); see also, THOMAS GRAHAM JR., DISARMAMENT
SKETCHES: THREE DECADES OF ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 235 (2002)
(describing the goals of the Agreed Framework).
25 See John S. Park, Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks, 28 WASH. Q. 75,
76 (2005) (discussing the discovery of North Korea’s nuclear program and the
United States’ response).
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supervising the freeze. 26 On January 10, 2003, North Korea
officially withdrew from the NPT. 27
The United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia
participated in the Six-Party Talks with North Korea in August
2003 in the hopes of negotiating an end to North Korea’s nuclear
program. 28 North Korea refused to attend the fourth round of talks
in October 2004 because of the “hostile climate created by the US
[sic].” 29 Although these talks continued into February 2007 30 and
resulted in a statement in which the United States agreed to end
trade sanctions in return for North Korea shutting down its nuclear
program, 31 on April 5, 2009, North Korea conducted a satellite
launch. 32 On April 14, 2009, after the United Nations Security
Council vowed to expand sanctions on the country, 33 North Korea
announced that it would “’never again take part in such [six party]
talks.’” 34
26 See Perry, supra note 18, at 83–84 (outlining the events of the “fifth nuclear
crisis” with North Korea in 2002).
27 See
North Korea Leaves Nuclear Pact, CNN.COM, Jan. 10, 2003,
http://articles.cnn.com/2003-01-10/world/nkorea.treaty_1_nuclear-weaponsnuclear-pact-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty?_s=PM:asiapcf (noting that “North
Korea’s announcement of its withdrawal from the NPT is largely symbolic, as it
has . . . admitted to be secretly pursuing a nuclear weapons program”).
28 See Jayshree Bajoria, The Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/publication/13593/ (last
updated July 1, 2009) (describing, among other things, the objectives of the parties
involved in the Six-Party Talks).
29 Korean Delegations Hold Bilateral Meeting Ahead of Six-Party Talks, RIA
NOVOSTI, July 24, 2005, http://en.rian.ru/world/20050724/40963132.html.
30 See
Timeline: N. Korea Nuclear Dispute, CNN, Feb. 13, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/02/10/nkorea.timeline/ (stating
that North Korea agreed to take the first steps towards nuclear disarmament on
February 13, 2007).
31 See Full Text of S. Korea-U.S. Summit Statement, KOR. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2008,
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2008/04/116_22786.html
(providing the full text of the U.S./South Korea Summit Statement).
32 See Sun-won Park, Pyongyang Fails Again: North Korea’s Third Missile Launch
(Apr.
6,
2009),
and
Kim
Jong-il’s
Miscalculation,
BROOKINGS
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0406_north_korea_park.aspx
(discussing the failures that characterized the launch).
33 See Geraldine Baum, U.N. Security Council Condemns North Korea Launch,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/14/world/fgun-north-korea14 (describing the presidential statement issued by the Security
Council which criticized the launch and agreed to tighten sanctions).
34 Mark Landler, North Korea Says It Will Halt Talks and Restart its Nuclear
Program, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2009, at A5 (quoting North Korea’s Foreign
Ministry).
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Thus far, North Korea has failed to fulfill any of its obligations
under international treaties and agreements, which suggests that
there are limitations to the enforcement mechanisms available and
flaws in the agreements themselves. If the United States hopes to
ensure its security, it must examine and address both of these
structural weaknesses, as well as the motivations behind North
Korea’s eagerness to take advantage of them.
2.1. Weaknesses of Current Disarmament Treaties and Agreements
According to Article II of the NPT, non-nuclear states cannot
attempt to obtain nuclear weapons or to manufacture their own. 35
The agreement only focuses on nuclear technology and makes no
mention of the raw materials necessary to make nuclear weapons.
North Korea could therefore use the “by-products which . . .
provide base materials for nuclear weapons.” 36 North Korea
would therefore not be in violation of the NPT when it used the
fissile material it supposedly produced while party to the
agreement 37 to create a nuclear device after withdrawing from the
NPT. The scope of the NPT is thus unnecessarily narrow because
it restricts the international community’s ability to respond to
countries’ clear attempts at obtaining nuclear weapons. 38
Article IV, section 2 of the NPT states, “[a]ll the Parties to the
Treaty undertake to facilitate and have the right to participate in
the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific
and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy.” 39 In other words, the NPT actually promotes the use and
transfer of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. By doing so,
the NPT provides countries with an easy means of gaining the
materials they need for nuclear weapons. Simply put, there exists
an almost irresistible incentive to manipulate the system.

NPT, supra note 7, art. II.
Helen M. Cousineau, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Global NonProliferation Regime: A U.S. Policy Agenda, 12 B.U. INT’L L.J. 407, 423 (1994).
37 See SHARON SQUASSONI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21391, NORTH KOREA’S
NUCLEAR WEAPONS: LATEST DEVELOPMENTS 3–4 (2006) (implying that North Korea
has been reprocessing materials since the early 1990s).
38 See Matthew Rice, NPT Review Conference Finds Consensus, Issues Document,
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, June 2000, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act
/2000_06/nptjun (suggesting that the narrow scope of the treaty is the result of
broad compromises by nuclear-weapons states regarding disarmament).
39 NPT, supra note 7, art. IV, para. 2.
35
36
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Article X of the NPT states that, “Each Party shall [with three
months notice and] in exercising its national sovereignty have the
right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary
events . . . have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” 40
There is no intermediate body to ensure that a country’s claim is
indeed legitimate. Thus, a country can take advantage of all the
privileges of being party to the NPT, and leave the treaty as soon
as it no longer suits the country to be a member. 41
Several of the provisions in the IAEA statute are similarly in
need of redrafting. For example, to be held liable under Article XI
of the statute, North Korea’s suspect nuclear program must have
“started out as an official IAEA project.”42 Article XII clearly states
that the “rights and responsibilities” or agency safeguards listed in
the statute apply only “[w]ith respect to any Agency project, or
other arrangement where the Agency is requested by the parties
concerned to apply safeguards.” 43 Thus, if North Korea’s nuclear
weapons originated from facilities not controlled and maintained
by the IAEA, it is difficult to find North Korea in violation of the
IAEA statute.
Article XII, section A, and Article III, section D, of the IAEA
Statute further highlight the inability of the statute to effectively
enforce agency safeguards. Article III, section D, states that,
“[s]ubject to the provisions of th[is] Statute . . . the activities of the
Agency shall be carried out with due observance of the sovereign
rights of States.” 44 Although the phrasing of this provision appears
to limit a state’s “sovereign rights” to decisions not governed by
the Statute, Article XII, section A, suggests otherwise. On its face,
the Statute requires countries to allow monitoring by inspectors. 45
Article XII, section A, however, says that the IAEA may only send
Id. art. X, para. 1.
See Erik Raines, North Korea: Analyzing the “New” Nuclear Threat, 12
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 349, 363 (2004) (“The language of the withdrawal
provision is inherently weak . . . as it allows for withdrawing countries to
subjectively determine what ‘extraordinary events’ have jeopardized its ‘supreme
interests.’”).
42 Matthew Liles, Comment, Did Kim Jong-II Break the Law? A Case Study on
How North Korea Highlights the Flaws of the Non-Proliferation Regime, 33 N.C. J. INT’L
L. & COM. REG. 103, 121 (2007).
43 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency art. XII(A), July 29,
1957, 8.1 U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter IAEA Statute].
44 Id. art. III(D).
45 See id. art. XII(A)(6) (describing the Agency’s right to send inspectors into
recipient states).
40
41
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inspectors into a country after consultation with “the State or States
concerned.” 46 North Korea’s past and present actions demonstrate
that, if given the choice, North Korea (like all countries) will
always choose to honor its personal goals over its international
commitments.
Though respect for state sovereignty is an
important principle in international law, lawmakers need to find a
better balance between respecting states’ interests and protecting
the international community.
The international community
therefore needs to make nuclear disarmament in North Korea’s
best interest if it hopes to capitalize upon the nation’s proclivity
towards basing decisions solely on its own interests. This can be
accomplished by offering economic aid or increased trade for
complying with disarmament treaties.
The Agreed Framework of 1994 lacks clarity and therefore
allows for manipulation by states. Article IV required North Korea
to remain in the NPT47 and also to comply with IAEA Safeguards
after “a significant portion of the LWR [light water reactor] project
[was] completed.” 48 The agreement also required the United States
to “make best efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply contract
with the DPRK within six months.” 49 While North Korea was
never really put in the position to deliver on its promise because of
the United States’ failure to implement many of the provisions in
the agreement, 50 there would have likely been conflicts over what
constituted “a significant portion” of the project and there likely
were disagreements over what constituted a “best effort” in
The Agreed Framework’s
securing the supply contract. 51
weakness also lies in its lack of implementation plans. For
instance, when discussing the project’s financing, the agreement
states: “The U.S. will organize . . . an international consortium to
Id.
See Agreed Framework, supra note 24, art. IV(1) (specifying North Korea’s
duty to remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons).
48 Id. art. IV(2)–(3) (emphasis added).
49 Id. art. I(1) (emphasis added).
50 See Stalemated LWR Project to Prompt Pyongyang to Restart N-Program,
PEOPLE’S KOREA, http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/042nd_issue/98051302.htm
(last visited Feb. 21, 2011) (discussing the conflicts arising from the United States’
failure to install civilian nuclear light reactors); see also Selig S. Harrison, Time to
Leave Korea?, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 62, 63 (describing the United States’
failure to phase out economic sanctions because of congressional opposition).
51 Agreed Framework, supra note 24, art. I(1), IV(3).
46
47
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finance and supply the LWR project to be provided to the
DPRK.” 52 There was neither specification as to how much money
was required of the United States (or who in the United States was
to provide this financing 53), nor was there clarification regarding
how international funding would be solicited.
Perhaps the biggest weakness of the Agreed Framework lies in
its narrow scope: it only applies to the “5MW(e) reactor, the
Radiochemical Laboratory . . . the fuel fabrication plant and the
partially built 50 and 200MW(e) nuclear power plants.” 54 If North
Korea manufactured weapons or reprocessed fuel in facilities other
than those specified, it would not be liable under the agreement.
While the North-South Joint Declaration provides a clear vision
of its objectives, it does not provide for a means of adjudication,
enforcement, or penalties. 55 Without any compliance mechanisms
in place, South Korea was left to take whatever it could get from a
defiant North Korea. 56 Another weakness of the Joint Declaration
lies in its verification system. Inspections are only permitted on
“objects chosen” by the side being examined, and must first be
approved by both sides; 57 inspections are not an “inherent right of
the requesting side.” 58 North Korea’s repeated refusals to allow
inspections would therefore be permissible under this agreement.
Because many of the disarmament agreements in place require
the cooperation of North Korea, it is not only important that the
United States strengthen the authority of these agreements, but it is
also imperative that the United States abandon its hostile policy
towards North Korea so as to make North Korea more willing to
comply.
Id. art. I(1).
See Interview by PBS with William Perry, U.S. Sec. of Def. from 1994–1997
(Feb.
26,
2003),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim
/interviews/perry.html (describing how, initially, the project was financed by the
U.S. Department of Defense emergency funds not under Congressional control).
54 IAEA Factsheet, supra note 11.
55 See North-South Joint Declaration, supra note 21 (detailing the terms of the
agreement to denuclearize North and South Korea).
56 See PETER HAYES & MICHAEL HAMEL-GREEN, THE PATH NOT TAKEN, THE WAY
STILL OPEN: DENUCLEARIZING THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND NORTHEAST ASIA 16
(2009), available at http://gc.nautilus.org/Nautilus/australia/apsnet/reports
/2009/hayes-hamel-green.pdf (reporting that South Korea “reverted to a small
number of annual inspections with advance warning—an almost meaningless
inspection arrangement”).
57 North-South Joint Declaration, supra note 21, art. IV.
58 HAYES & HAMEL-GREEN, supra note 56, at 16.
52
53
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WEAKNESSES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Even if North Korea is found in breach of these agreements and
treaties, it is not clear whether the remaining parties have any
means of gaining justice through international law. An advisory
opinion issued by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) held
that the “threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be
contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed
conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian
law.” 59
One could claim that the ICJ may not have jurisdiction over the
trials that occurred on April 5, 2009, and July 4, 2009, 60 because
these were tests of weapons, not actual uses of them in armed
conflict. Furthermore, although the ICJ has acknowledged that the
possession of nuclear weapons “may indeed justify an inference of
preparedness to use them,” 61 and may therefore constitute an
actionable “threat,” it is unclear whether this is indeed the case for
North Korea. North Korea has represented that it only intends to
use its missiles in self-defense. 62 There is therefore no real “threat”
at issue here, because there is neither a sense of immediacy nor an
identifiable target.
The ICJ does not even support the contention that the
possession of nuclear weapons is illegal because of the existence of
treaties like the NPT wherein nuclear-weapon States offer security
assurances to non-nuclear weapon States. 63 The fact that nuclearweapon States are permitted to keep their weaponry and, even use
it in particular circumstances, proves that “[t]here is in neither
customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive

59 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, para. 105(2)(E) (July 8).
60 See North Korea Missile Tests Defy UN, BBC NEWS, July 4, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8134115.stm (reporting on North Korea’s most
recent nuclear tests which involved the firing of a series of missiles into the Sea of
Japan).
61 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 59, para. 48.
62 See Richard Sisk, World Trembles as Despot Goes Ballistic. North Korea
Unleashes Blast and Could Hit Button on a Second, DAILY NEWS, Oct. 10, 2006, at 7
(quoting Pak Gil Yon, a North Korean diplomat, as saying that nuclear tests afford
his country a “defense capability ”).
63 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 59, para.
59(c) (discussing assurances made by the United States, United Kingdom, and
USSR to assist non-nuclear weapon states that are the victims of nuclear
weapons).
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and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons
as such.” 64 As evidenced in the aforementioned paragraph, the ICJ
was only willing to acknowledge that these actions are generally
contrary to the rules of international law, and was quick to concede
that their threat and use may be permissible in “extreme
circumstance[s] of self-defence.” 65
The Martens Clause is a part of the laws of armed conflict and
is subject to a variety of interpretations. 66 At its most restricted
reading, the Clause states that customary international law, those
unwritten aspects of international law that derive from convention,
continues to apply after the adoption of a treaty. 67 Under a wider
interpretation, the Clause provides that things that are not
explicitly prohibited by a treaty are not ipso facto permitted. 68 If
the aforementioned ICJ opinion is indeed a summation and
consensus of the general practice of states, then under the Martens
Clause, Korea is not liable for the possession or testing of nuclear
weapons—a practice found in countries like the United States 69
and France. 70 Furthermore, even if North Korea were found in
violation of a provision of the ICJ advisory opinion, the very status
of the document as such makes it non-binding. 71 Advisory
opinions are only binding after they are ratified or incorporated

Id. para. 105(2)(B) (noting the abovementioned conclusion by an 11-3 vote).
Id. at 263.
66 See Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 317
INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 125, 126 (1997) (describing various interpretations of
the Martens Clause and how it has been used historically in international law).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See
Gallery of U.S. Nuclear Tests, NUCLEAR WEAPON ARCHIVE,
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Tests/ (last updated Feb. 6, 2001)
(discussing the high number of nuclear tests the United States has conducted by
revealing that “1054 nuclear tests” were recorded “[b]etween 16 July 1945 and 23
September 1992”).
70 See Fifteenth Anniversary of France's Last Nuclear Test, CTBTO
Preparatory
Comm'n
(Jan.
27,
2011),
http://www.ctbto.org/presscentre/highlights/2011/fifteenth-anniversaryof-frances-last-nuclear-test/ (noting
that France has carried out 210 nuclear tests, the last of which took place on
January 27, 1996).
71 See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS
83–84 (5th ed. 1995) (detailing that although a state can be a party to a statute and
therefore qualified to be a party to litigation, jurisdiction is not necessarily
conferred to the Court).
64
65
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into a separate agreement, 72 and this has not yet been
accomplished in North Korea.
Although one would believe North Korea could be held liable
under the principle of good faith for its numerous nuclear
transgressions, the rule is too expansive to limit the country. It
holds that, once a state makes a promise, it has the duty to fulfill it
so that “interested States may . . . place confidence in them.” 73
Furthermore, “an international obligation assumed by unilateral
declaration” is “binding;” 74 in other words, when a state agent
makes a declaration and thereby creates a reasonable reliance from
others that it will meet its promise, it is obliged to deliver on it.
Although this appears to be a reasonable safeguard against empty
promises by world leaders, it offers them the opportunity to escape
existing international obligations simply by making new
declarations. It is not clear, therefore, whether North Korea
violated the 1994 Agreed Framework and, by extension, the
principle of good faith when it announced it would restart its
plutonium production in December 2002. 75 On the one hand,
Korea has a duty to follow through on its commitment to freeze its
nuclear program. On the other hand, however, Korea created a
competing obligation to unfreeze the program through its
unilateral declaration.
The IAEA is similar to a United States government agency in
the sense that it “must look elsewhere to enforce its
determinations.” 76 It may only suspend the “privileges and rights
of membership” 77 of noncompliant members and must look to the
I.C.J., 78 the United Nations General Assembly, or the Security

72 See How the Court Works, INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icjcij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=6 (last visited Feb. 20, 2011) (revealing that a
state must consent to the jurisdiction of the Court in order for the decision to be
binding).
73 Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 473 (Dec. 20).
74 Id.
75 See Benjamin Friedman, Fact Sheet: North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,
CTR. FOR DEF. INFO., http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/nk-fact-sheet.cfm (last updated
Jan. 23, 2003) (recounting the history of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program).
76 Liles, supra note 42, at 135.
77 IAEA Statute, supra note 43, art. XII(C).
78 See id. art. XVII(A) (declaring that the International Court of Justice will
review disputes over the “interpretation or application” of the statute that are not
settled by negotiation).
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Council for actual enforcement. 79 North Korea therefore has little
reason to respect or obey a group with so little power itself.
With respect to North Korea, the problem with the Security
Council lies in the right of member states to challenge council
decisions. 80 Under international law, “a state has a right to
challenge the validity of acts of international organizations” (i.e.
the Security Council) both during and following the “decisionmaking process.” 81 If countries can question the legality of
Security Council decisions, it is difficult to draw the line between
this right to challenge resolutions and the competing duty to
comply with Security Council decisions. This escape clause
functions as yet another way North Korea can ignore its
international disarmament obligations.
The weaknesses of both the treaties and the enforcement
mechanisms currently in place suggest that the United States
cannot disarm North Korea solely through legal means. The
United States must use the extralegal tools of diplomacy and
respect if it hopes to accomplish its goal.
4. THE SIX-PARTY NUCLEAR TALKS AS A MODEL OF THE UNITED
STATES’ INEFFECTIVE APPROACH TO DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS
UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
In order to resolve the nuclear threat posed by North Korea, the
United States must resume diplomatic negotiations through a
process similar to the Six-Party Talks that occurred from 2003 to
2007. These talks will only be successful, however, if the United
States abandons its hostile approach and makes a concerted effort
to be cooperative and respectful. This will allow for the drafting of
improved treaties and agreements and, more importantly, it may
make North Korea more committed to honoring its promises of
disarmament.
On December 12, 2002, North Korea stated that its decision to
“refreeze” its nuclear program depended “entirely . . . on the

79 See id. art. III(B)(4) (providing further enforcement options through the
Security Council because of its status as the “organ bearing the main
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”).
80 See DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER
CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER 206 (2001) (discussing the remedies available to
member states who challenge council decisions).
81 Id. at 207.
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attitude” of the United States. 82 The “attitude” of the United States
during this time, however, was one of antagonism and disrespect.
For instance, in his 2002 State of the Union address, Bush
categorized North Korea as a part of the “Axis of Evil,” prompting
the North Korea Foreign Ministry to describe the act as “little short
of declaring a war against” the country. 83 On February 5, 2003,
then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described North Korea
as a “terrorist regime” that had the capability of selling nuclear
weapons technology and materials to terrorists and rogue
nations. 84 This statement only resulted in apologies from senior
administration officials and angered North Korea, 85 likely
contributing to a delay in the commencement of the Six-Party
Talks. As inconsequential as comments and “attitudes” may seem,
they play an important role in affecting U.S.-North Korean
diplomatic relations. Broad characterizations do not appear to
accomplish anything but increased hostility and should therefore
be kept to a minimum to facilitate successful future negotiations.
Another obstacle that continually stands in the way of U.S.North Korea negotiations are the preconditions these countries
established both prior to and convening at the bargaining table.
During the Three-Party Talks that occurred between April 23 and
April 25 in 2003, for example, North Korea proposed to suspend its
nuclear program in exchange for energy and aid. 86 The U.S.,
however, insisted that it would meet North Korea’s demands only
after it “scrap[ped] its nuclear program.” 87 It went on to demand
North Korea’s “complete[], verifiabl[e] and irreversibl[e]”

82 Paul Kerr, North Korea Quits NPT, Says It Will Restart Nuclear Facilities,
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 2003, available at http://www.armscontrol.org
/print/1195.
83 Bush’s ‘Evil Axis’ Comment Stirs Critics, BBC NEWS, Feb. 2, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1796034.stm.
84 James Dao, Bush Administration Defends Its Approach on North Korea, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at A13.
85 See id. (describing North Korea’s negative response to Rumsfeld’s
statement).
86 See generally Pyongyang Allegedly Hints Nuclear Possession at “3-Party Talks”;
http://www1.koreaMakes
“New
Bold
Proposal,”
PEOPLE’S KOREA,
np.co.jp/pk/191th_issue/2003042601.htm (discussing the details of the Three
Party Talks).
87 Id.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss3/5

PALOMINO.DOC

2011]

3/18/2011 3:15 PM

DISARMING NORTH KOREA VIA DIPLOMACY

951

disarmament as a precondition to any future talks. 88 This resulted
in a stalemate that was only broken after China served as a
mediator to bring the two parties together for the first round of the
Six-Party talks on August 27–29, 2003. 89
Again, there was no progress in negotiations, as the United
States demanded that North Korea end its nuclear programs before
it would offer economic assistance and diplomatic normalization,
while North Korea insisted that the U.S. first offer security
guarantees. 90 Therefore, to ensure that future negotiations are
successful, both parties need to approach the bargaining table
without preconditions and with a willingness to compromise. No
country can be expected to jeopardize the safety of its citizens and
make itself vulnerable to attack based on another country’s
promise. If it is indeed the case that North Korea “can never
accept” the demand that it drop its nuclear program first, 91 the
most reasonable approach would allow for the two countries to
begin efforts simultaneously, instead of chronologically. 92
This diplomatic policy of compromise should extend to the
types of negotiations the United States is willing to enter. North
Korea has consistently insisted on its dislike of multilateral
negotiations and its desire to conduct direct negotiations with the
United States. 93 Despite this fact, the United States has consistently
88 U.S. Urged to Accept DPRK-Proposed Simultaneous Package Solution, KOREAN
CENT. NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 15, 2003, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003
/200312/news12/16.htm.
89 See generally Tae-Hwan Kwak, The Six-Party Nuclear Talks: An Evaluation
and Policy Recommendations, Remarks at the 45th Annual Convention of the
International Studies Association 6 (Mar. 17, 2004) (unpublished paper, on file
with Eastern Kentucky University) (analyzing the origin of the Korean nuclear
crisis, evaluating the six-party talk as an effective framework for resolving the
nuclear issue, and providing recommendations for resolving the North Korean
nuclear issue).
90 See id. at 6–7 (discussing the interactions between each member of the SixParty Talks).
91 U.S. Urged to Accept Simultaneous Action and Package Solution, KOREAN CENT.
NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 1, 2003, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200312/news12
/02.htm.
92 See generally, Keynote Speeches Made at Six-Way Talks, KOREAN CENT. NEWS
AGENCY, Aug. 29, 2003, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200308/news08
/30.htm (outlining North Korea’s proposal for a package solution and the
principle of simultaneous actions).
93 See Ed Henry et al., N. Korea Feels ‘Owed’ Direct Talks With U.S., Richardson
Says, CNN, Aug. 19, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08
/19/us.north.korea.richardson/index.html?iref=allsearch (“North Korea believes
it’s owed bilateral talks with the United States after the communist government
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forced North Korea to negotiate within a multilateral framework. 94
Only recently, this policy led North Korea to vow “never again [to]
take part in” the Six Party Talks in response to a U.S.-backed UN
Security Council resolution condemning its April 5, 2009 satellite
launch. 95 Although “internationaliz[ing]” 96 the nuclear issue is
considered a key protection for the international community, the
United States should take any opportunity to negotiate with North
Korea. If North Korea believed in the process leading to a future
agreement, it might be far more likely comply with the ultimate
agreement.
Overall, the United States must abandon its hard-line policy of
inflexibility if it hopes to bring about North Korea’s disarmament.
Chinese Vice Minister Wang Yi put it best when he said, “the main
problem we are facing” is not North Korean, but U.S. policy. 97
While it is important that the United States does not make
concessions that endanger its interests, it should adopt a
diplomatic policy that allows for the assignment of compensation.
By offering incentives for North Korea to dismantle its nuclear
program, the United States provides “a face-saving way” for North
Korea’s President to achieve the disarmament of his country. 98 The
United States should not view concessions as “reward[s],” but
should rather view them as an essential means to gaining North

released two detained American journalists . . . .”); Gov. Bill Richardson on North
Korea’s Nuclear Weapons, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Aug. 19, 2009),
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/08/19/gov_bill_richardson_on_
north_koreas_nukes_97971.html (“[T]he issue is should that dialogue be in the
context of the six-party talks which the United States wants with the other Asian
countries or bilaterally as the North Koreans want, directly U.S./North Korea.”);
N. Korea for No-War Pact with USA, TRIBUNE INDIA, Jan. 31, 2003,
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2003/20030201/world.htm#5 (“We are not only
opposed to any attempt to internationalise the nuclear issue on the Korean
peninsula but also we will never participate in any form of multilateral talks.”)
(quoting North Korea’s ambassador in Beijing).
94 See Kwak, supra note 89, at 5 (“The U.S. has insisted that the North Korean
nuclear crisis be resolved . . . within a multilateral framework, through the United
Nations.”).
95 Landler, supra note 34.
96 See Kwak, supra note 90, at 5 (noting that North Korea “wants direct
negotiations with the U.S. on the nuclear issue“).
97 Glenn Kessler, U.S. Has a Shifting Script on N. Korea, WASH. POST, Dec. 7,
2003, at A25.
98 See Kwak, supra note 89, at 12 (discussing President Roh Moo Hyun’s
suggestion to offer North Korea incentives for disarming its nuclear program so
that North Korea’s President might save face).
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Korea’s trust and respect. 99 It is only fair, for instance, that “as the
U.S. urges [North Korea] to dismantle its nuclear weapons
completely, verifiably and irreversibly, the latter has the same right
to demand the U.S., the dialogue partner, give it complete,
verifiable, and irreversible security assurances.” 100
The United States cannot expect North Korea to dismantle its
nuclear program without seeing any action on the United States’
part until completion. While these incentives may involve costly
expenditures, like providing energy assistance in the form of oil,
they may provide the key to achieving North Korea’s complete
disarmament. North Korean leaders will simply be more likely to
compromise and comply with agreements if they believe they are
being treated fairly.
The United States’ “hostile” diplomatic policy towards North
Korea is most evident in the unreceptive and inhospitable
mannerisms of its leaders and representatives. In the end, this
approach only frustrates both United States and North Korean
goals. The North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-Gwan,
for instance, blamed the inconclusive results of the Six-Party Talks
in April and August 2003 on “U.S. hostile policies toward North
Korea.” 101 In fact, he commented on the discourteousness of the
U.S. chief delegate, 102 saying that “the settlement of the nuclear
issue [would] depend entirely upon [a] change in the U.S.
attitude.” 103 This hostile attitude again frustrated United States
objectives in 2004, when President Bush sent a curt directive to the
U.S. delegation at the second round of the Six-Party Talks to make
it clear that “the administration’s patience in diplomatically
seeking North Korea’s dismantling of its weapons program could
run out.” 104 This actually stopped the discussions the six parties
99 See U.S. Urged to Accept DPRK-Proposed Simultaneous Package Resolution,
supra note 88 (analyzing shortcomings in the U.S.-North Korea nuclear
disarmament talks, and suggesting that the United States not view incentives to
North Korea as rewards, but rather as assurances of good faith).
100 Id.
101 Kwak, supra note 89, at 16.
102 DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-Way Talks, KOR. CENT. NEWS
AGENCY, Feb. 29, 2004, available at http://www.nautilus.org/publications/books
/dprkbb/multilateralTalks/DPRKSixwayTalks.html/ (saying that the U.S. chief
delegate, “only read the prepared script without stammering and showed no
sincerity, giving no answer even to the questions raised”).
103 Id.
104 Glenn Kessler, Bush Signals Patience on North Korea is Waning, WASH. POST,
Mar. 4, 2004, at A14.
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were having on a joint statement for finally settling the nuclear
dispute, resulting in an empty reconfirmation of the parties’
commitment to denuclearizing North Korea and a delay in
resolving important issues. 105 To achieve any kind of headway in
this nuclear debate, leaders and representatives of the U.S. must
therefore abandon their arrogance in favor of humility and respect.
5.

CONCLUSION: CREATIVE DIPLOMACY AS AN EFFECTIVE MEANS
OF DISARMAMENT

The United States should abandon its hostile diplomatic policy
in favor of statecraft, or creative diplomacy. This is “the art of
developing an effective geopolitical strategy and executing it
through the intelligent use of all appropriate instruments of
Statecraft challenges contemporary notions of
power.” 106
diplomacy that consider mediation initiatives and sustained
diplomatic campaigns as ineffective and overly accommodating
means of foreign policy. Statecraft does not abandon war and
coercion as legitimate means of diplomacy, it only advocates that
countries use “hard power intelligently, recognizing both its
potential and its limits.” 107 The Bush administration did not
recognize the “limits” of its hostile foreign policy, allowing it to
undermine its goals abroad.
Two of the most important aspects of statecraft involve having
“clearly defined objectives and policy consensus within
government . . . [and] accurate, realistic assessments of obstacles
and of the resources required to overcome them.” 108 The Obama
administration needs to approach future negotiations with North
Korea with a realistic and detailed plan for its disarmament. In
order to avoid the financial and political obstacles that prevented
105

See Kwak, supra note 89.

Bush’s directive essentially halted the discussions on the detailed
statement. China instead began to prepare for a bland statement that
would commit the parties to continuing the talks at a later date. But that
effort failed as well after last-minute demands by North Korea delayed
the closing ceremony for several hours. In the end, the parties
downgraded their communiqué to a ‘chairman’s statement.
Id. at 18.
106 Chester A. Crocker, The Art of Peace: Bringing Diplomacy Back to
Washington, FOREIGN AFF., July–Aug. 2007, at 160, 161 (reviewing DENNIS ROSS,
STATECRAFT: AND HOW TO RESTORE AMERICA’S STANDING IN THE WORLD (2007)).
107 Id. (emphasis added).
108 Id.
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the successful implementation of the Agreed Framework of 1994,
this administration needs to garner sufficient intra-governmental
support before it becomes involved in any future disarmament
negotiations. Most importantly, it needs to have a clear sense of
what it is trying to accomplish: the complete disarmament of
North Korea (as proposed during the Three-Party Talks in 2003), or
the establishment of a controlled and heavily monitored nuclear
weapon state (as permitted in the NPT).
A “realistic assessment[] of [the] obstacles and of the resources
required” to effect North Korea’s successful disarmament involves
acknowledging that North Korea may not want to negotiate or
comply with its agreements if it is not offered concessions. 109 It
also involves acknowledging that our hostile, and often
discourteous, actions and attitudes have continually served as a
major obstacle to successful negotiations with North Korea. In the
end, the only way we will get North Korea to comply with
international agreements and international law is by working
cooperatively and fairly alongside North Korea–North Koreans
will only obey and respect laws they themselves helped craft.
5.1. From Bush to Obama: The United States’ Renewed Commitment
to Creative Diplomacy
The United States’ latest use of creative diplomacy, and the
relative success of this approach, is best illustrated by the events
surrounding the imprisonment of American journalists, Laura Ling
and Euna Lee. In June 2009, the North Korean government
sentenced these journalists to twelve years of hard labor for
illegally entering North Korean territory. 110 The North Korean
government pardoned the women after former President Bill
Clinton met with Kim Jong Il in North Korea and, in the words of
the North Korean state media, “apologized” 111 for the women’s
actions. Although the White House and the State Department have
repeatedly insisted that Mr. Clinton was on a “private

Id.
See Glenn Kessler, N. Korea Releases U.S. Journalists, WASH. POST, Aug. 5,
2009, at A1 (discussing the pardon that North Korea issued to two detained
American journalists after Bill Clinton met with Kim Jong Il).
111 See Mark Landler & Peter Baker, Clinton Secures 2 Pardons; All 3 Leave
North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2009, at A1 (describing the roles of Bill and
Hillary Clinton in the release of the journalists).
109
110
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humanitarian mission,” 112 several factors suggest that the trip was
indeed conducted on the Obama administration’s behalf. 113 If
Clinton’s trip was indeed a diplomatic move, it appears to have
been very artfully conducted to win the respect and cooperation of
North Korea’s Kim Jong II. According to the Korean Central News
Agency, Clinton’s apology was “sincere” and his manner was
“courteous.” 114
This courteous attitude was likely adopted as a means of
remedying the fallout that occurred just two weeks earlier when
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton compared North Korea’s nuclear
test and missile launchings to the behavior of an “attention-seeking
teenager.” 115 In response to Clinton’s statement, the North
Koreans only rejoined with further insults: “Mrs. Clinton [is] . . .
unaware of the elementary etiquette in the international
community [and] . . . [s]ometimes she looks like a primary
schoolgirl and sometimes a pensioner going shopping.” 116 The

Kessler, supra note 110.
See John R. Bolton, Op.-Ed., Clinton’s Unwise Trip to North Korea, WASH.
POST, Aug. 4, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2009/08/04/AR2009080401486.html (claiming that “it seems that the Obama
administration not only chose to negotiate, but to send a former president to do
so.”); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Private” Diplomacy: Following Clinton Visit,
North Korea Pardons U.S. Journalists, DISSENTING JUSTICE (Aug. 4, 2009, 9:25 PM),
http://dissentingjustice.blogspot.com/2009/08/private-diplomacy-followingclinton.html (asserting that “[g]iven Clinton’s status as a former president and
Hillary Clinton’s status as the current Secretary of State (not to mention the
strained relations between the United States and North Korea), his visit definitely
has diplomatic overtones, and it was possibly designed for that purpose.”); Jack
Tapper, Former US Envoy to North Korea Ambassador Jack Pritchard: “They Needed a
Prop. This Was the Prop,” ABC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2009, 5:31 PM),
http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/08/former-us-envoy-to-northkorea-ambassador-jack-pritchard-they-needed-a-prop-this-was-the-prop.html
(quoting Pritchard, former US Ambassador to North Korea: “it’s not a personal
mission . . . clearly the administration wanted to insulate themselves. They
wanted in the public’s and particularly in the North Koreans’ mind for this to be
seen a [sic] separate issue other than the nuclear issue that’s going on.”); see also
Landler & Baker, supra note 111 (stating that the initiative “came after weeks of
back-channel talks between the United States and North Korea through its United
Nations mission”).
114 See Kessler, supra note 110 (reporting that “Clinton expressed words of
sincere apology to Kim Jong Il for the hostile acts committed by the two American
journalists.”)
115 Landler & Baker, supra note 111.
116 Mark Landler, Clinton and North Korea Engage in Tense Exchange, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 2009, at A10 (describing the “acrimonious exchange[s]” between
Hillary Clinton and Kim Jong Il).
112
113
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North Korean’s focus on Mrs. Clinton’s lack of “etiquette” points to
the importance of good manners in successful international
relations. This exchange clearly frustrated America’s efforts at
disarming North Korea, as the majority of the banter occurred
during a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,
and it thereby overshadowed and “competed for attention with
Mrs. Clinton’s campaign to marshal worldwide pressure on the
North Koreans to dismantle their nuclear weapons program.” 117
The North Korean’s ill will was most evident when they reiterated
at a news conference on the same day that they “would never
return to multiparty talks.” 118
In changing its approach to North Korea, the United States
clearly made an “accurate, realistic assessment[] of [the]
obstacles” 119 posed by these hostile confrontations with North
Korea. King Jong II could never oblige a country whose leaders
publicly hurl humiliating insults at him without losing the respect
of his own people. The United States clearly realized this, as Mrs.
Clinton “moderated her tone with regard to the case, moving from
declaring in June that the charges [against the journalists] were
‘absolutely without merit or foundation’ to saying [in July] that the
journalists ‘are deeply regretful, and we are very sorry it’s
happened.’” 120
The importance of civility and respect in the international
relations arena is further evidenced by the fact that, for Kim Jong
II, the freeing and pardoning of the women was a “reciprocal
humanitarian gesture” in response to Mr. Clinton’s decision during
his presidency to send Mr. Kim a letter of condolence on the death
of his father. 121 Clearly, the past and present approaches exhibited
by Mr. Clinton were instrumental in securing the freedom of these
American journalists.
The international community has taken note of President
Obama’s embrace of creative diplomacy, as he was recently
awarded the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize for his “extraordinary efforts
to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between
Id.
Id.
119 See Crocker, supra note 106 (arguing that a deeper understanding of the
interplay between diplomacy, strategy, and power is essential to successful U.S.
foreign relations).
120 Kessler, supra note 110.
121 Landler & Baker, supra note 111.
117
118
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peoples.” 122 In describing its decision to award Obama, the
Norwegian Nobel Committee noted that “[m]ultilateral diplomacy
has regained a central position, with emphasis on the role that the
United Nations and other international institutions can play.
Dialogue and negotiations are preferred as instruments for
resolving even the most difficult international conflicts.” 123
Multilateralism is defined as “any system associating several
states which are united by equal and mutual obligations, by
common rules.” 124 Former President George W. Bush was heavily
criticized during his presidency for “an excessive reliance on
unilateral action and U.S. military power.” 125 The Committee
therefore awarded President Obama the Nobel Prize in hopes that
it would encourage the president to continue utilizing international
institutions as a means of seeking cooperation and compromise
with other countries.
Since being awarded the Nobel Prize, President Obama has
delivered on his promise to utilize less hostile tactics in the United
State’s international affairs. In April 2009, President Obama issued
a call for the creation of a summit that would address the problem
of nuclear terrorism by “bolstering international cooperation and
improving security for nuclear materials worldwide.” 126 Last April
in Washington, D.C., the Global Nuclear Security Summit brought
over forty nations and several international organizations together
to discuss “the nature of the threat and develop steps that can be
taken together to secure vulnerable materials, combat nuclear

122 Obama: Nobel Peace Prize is “Call to Action”, CNN WORLD (Oct. 9, 2009),
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-10-09/world/nobel.peace.prize_1_norwegian-nobel
-committee-international-diplomacy-and-cooperation-nuclear-weapons?_s=PM
:WORLD.
123 Press Release, Norwegian Nobel Committee, The Nobel Peace Prize for
2009 (Oct. 9, 2009), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace
/laureates/2009/press.html.
124 Philippe Moreau Defarges, Le Multilatéralisme et la Fin de l’Histoire, 3
ÉTRANGÈRE
575,
576
(2004)
(Gregory
Eliott
trans.),
POLITIQUE
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/0104Moreau_Defarges_gb.pdf.
125 Obama: Nobel Peace Prize is “Call to Action”, supra note 122.
126 John Isaacs & Leonor Tomero, Fact Sheet: 2010 Global Nuclear Security
Summit, CTR. FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION (Dec. 9, 2009),
http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearweapons/articles/120909_glo
bal_nuclear_security_summit/.
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smuggling and deter, detect, and disrupt attempts at nuclear
terrorism.” 127
President Obama clearly hopes to affect the disarmament of
North Korea, and other countries presenting nuclear threats,
through negotiation, respect, and cooperation and, if the results of
Mr. Clinton’s visit to North Korea are any indication of the value of
creative diplomacy, this new approach will be an effective one.

Press Release, The White House, Addressing the Nuclear Threat: Fulfilling
the Promise of Prague at the L’Aquila Summit (July 8, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Addressing-the-Nuclear-ThreatFulfilling-the-Promise-of-Prague-at-the-LAquila-Summit/
(emphasis
added)
(discussing President Obama’s three-part strategy to address the international
nuclear threat).
127
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